

From the Editors

This open issue of *German Politics and Society* features three papers that address matters of change in contemporary Germany. In our lead article we are proud to offer yet again the work of Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich, arguably among the most original researchers and prolific writers on the crucial topic of immigration in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. In this piece, Münz and Ulrich provide a bevy of detailed empirical data on immigration and citizenship in Germany. They succeed in using these rich data to construct their own theories on immigration and citizenship in Germany that are critical of existing policies, including those of the Red-Green government.

Stephen Kalberg then presents a very insightful analysis of the continued difficulties, even animosities, between east and west Germans in the arduous and complex unification process. He anchors his observations in two major axes: the tempo of life and work on the one hand, and interaction patterns in society and culture on the other. Lastly, Wolfgang Schroeder and Rainer Weinert harness their profound expertise in matters of industrial relations to explain their views as to how processes of decentralization in the German political economy need not lead to a wholesale abandonment of the tried and true "German model."

In a brilliant Forum piece, Earl Jeffrey Richards provides a scathing critique of the Schneider/Schwerte affair. Unlike many previous commentators who viewed the surreptitious metamorphosis of a committed Nazi to a benevolent liberal as an apt representation of the Bonn Republic, Richards sees this act of deception and its subsequent approval by many a German intellectual as worrisome events. Six book reviews conclude this issue of *German Politics and Society*.

Immigration and Citizenship in Germany¹

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In Germany, as in many other European democracies, immigration and citizenship are contested and contentious issues. In the German case it was both the magnitude of postwar and recent immigration as well as its interference with questions of identity that created political and social conflict. As a result of World War II, the coexistence of two German states, and the persistence of ethnic German minorities in central and eastern Europe, (West) Germany's migration and naturalization policy was inclusive toward expellees, GDR citizens, and co-ethnics. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany, despite the recruitment of several million foreign labor migrants and—until 1992—a relatively liberal asylum practice, did not develop similar mechanisms and policies of absorption and integration of its legal foreign residents. The late 1980s and 1990s first saw a rise in the number of ethnic German and foreign immigrants, then growing skepticism and even hostility towards immigrants. The political answer to this situation was the implementation of measures restricting the inflow of ethnic Germans, asylum seekers, and some other categories of foreigners, and the reduction of their access to both the labor market and public benefits. At the same time, several attempts were made to liberalize naturalization procedures and to install a more inclusive citizenship law in spite of serious opposition from the conservative part of the political spectrum. The most important change was the introduction of a new citizenship law in the summer of 1999 by the SPD/Green government. What remains unresolved is the politically and economically marginal position of the majority of

foreign immigrants from Mediterranean countries and also of those ethnic Germans who came during the 1990s from Russia and Kazakhstan. Another persistent problem is the low share of legal foreign residents who get naturalized every year.

The threat of a growing population of foreigners excluded from political participation is not the only problem in this context. Since World War II, Germany has received substantial immigration of foreigners and ethnic Germans. Over the last few years immigration has declined, and in 1997 and 1998 there were more foreigners emigrating than immigrating. However, a large part of the German public still perceives immigration more as a burden than as an enrichment for the country and is afraid of a lack of control over immigration. A legal basis to regulate the total of all immigration streams—an immigration law—has been demanded repeatedly by experts. But the SPD and the Greens only supported such proposals as long as they were opposition parties; since they formed a coalition government such plans have been dropped from their political agendas.

In the past, German research on migration and integration has mainly used immigrants' nationality as a point of orientation. In the 1950s the field was dominated by research on ethnic German expellees (that is, German citizens originating from former German territory annexed to Poland, and the Soviet Union; and non-citizens expelled by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia).² In addition to analyzing the history, the circumstances of expulsion, and the contemporary life of this group, there was also an underlying attempt to demonstrate that this group had experienced a grave injustice.³ In contrast, the life, biographies, and contemporary living conditions of Jewish emigrants expelled during the Nazi era, of former forced laborers, survivors of concentration camps, and other "displaced persons" were not themes of social science research in postwar Germany.⁴

In the 1960s and early 1970s, research on "guest workers" started both in Germany and Switzerland.⁵ In contrast to the post-war migrants, labor migrants from the Mediterranean were portrayed as a problem group. The phrases "guest worker problem" or "guest worker question" were generally used to refer to migration-related political and social problems in the receiving countries, and not to the difficulties and constraints of the migrants themselves.

From the early 1980s until approximately 1988 there was little political discussion about immigration to Germany and the social integration of immigrants. Neither continuing chain migration through family reunion nor the existence of a "second generation" of migrants received much attention in the public sphere. Consequently, research during that time concentrated less on the current socio-economic situation of migrants, and more on the history of migration from and to Germany.⁶ The focus of research has changed dramatically since 1988/89. The ongoing debate on the consequences of immigration is a direct result of the dramatic changes in central and eastern Europe, including the impact of change on massive out-migration from this region⁷ and the massive refugee flows caused by the wars and forced expulsions in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (including Kosovo). Suddenly the question of asylum seekers, refugees, and temporary protection was pushed to the forefront of the agenda.⁸

Political science also began to discuss and analyze several aspects of international migration. Facing a manifest increased demand for control, questions concerning possible state actions to limit immigration were and are increasingly being pushed onto the agenda at both the national and European levels.⁹ Some authors increasingly portrayed migration as a problem of national and international security.¹⁰

There has been a growing interest in the North American debate on multiculturalism since the 1980s. Some expected that Germany would be enriched by more "diversity."¹¹ For some authors, foreign migrants and their children were no longer viewed as migrants, but as members of ethno-cultural minorities in Germany.¹² Others pointed to the growing social and economic integration of labor migrants and their children.¹³ Certainly, though, there were also a few increasingly skeptical voices that pointed to a continuing marginalization and (self)isolation of the foreign population, especially the so-called second generation.¹⁴ Some even identified a considerable potential for conflict and interethnic violence.¹⁵ In addition, the 1990s saw the introduction of research on ethnic German migrants (that is, *Aussiedler*).¹⁶ Ultimately, Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union¹⁷ and the increasing mobility of highly qualified workers also received some attention.¹⁸ Since the 1980s, interest in the topic of migration has also increased among economists studying the positive and negative effects of immigration,¹⁹ the impact of immigra-

tion on the labor market,²⁰ the financing of social security,²¹ and the demand for welfare benefits.²²

Interestingly, the various traditions of German migration research mentioned above overlapped only minimally. Interactions remained an exception both at the theoretical as well as at the empirical level. In research on labor migrants ("guest workers"), almost no attention has been paid to the research done on expellees. The research on foreigners of the 1990s learned very little from the research on "guest workers" of the 1960s and 1970s, and neither has had much influence on the analysis of immigration and the lack of integration of ethnic German *Aussiedler*. The main reason for this is the general reluctance (even in scientific analysis) to put expellees and ethnic Germans from central and eastern Europe on an equal footing with foreign migrants. Therefore, comparing the two groups either did not come to mind or appeared to be politically incorrect as long as expellees and ethnic German *Aussiedler* successfully claimed not to be "immigrants" at all while foreign immigrants and their children were portrayed in many instances as being of "transitory" status to the German economy and society (compare the terms *Gastarbeiter* or *Asylanten*). Exceptions to this are the works of Bade, Bethlehem, and Gugel, as well as a study by the Ministry of Employment, Health and Social Services of North Rhine-Westphalia.²³

Our own research summarized in this article relates to the few attempts to look at migration as a whole, that is, to analyse the stocks and flows of expellees, ethnic Germans, and foreign immigrants alike and to look at the demographic and societal impacts. Furthermore we have tried to introduce the criterion "place of birth" that is regularly used in U.S. research and statistics but is so far not common to the German research tradition. The main criterion used by the German administration and reflected in available statistical information is citizenship, not place of birth. This choice has to do with the fact that Germany does not view itself as an immigration country. Both the political and administrative apparatuses, as well as most researchers in Germany, use the criterion of nationality as their main point of orientation. This same criterion of citizenship is used in official statistics. National and other statistics provide information about the German and foreign populations in Germany according to age, sex, marital status, and birth rate. But no information can be found about place or

country of birth for either Germans or non-Germans. Using nationality as a central defining criterion increases the tendency to see non-Germans, regardless of their place of birth, as the "true immigrants," whereas ethnic Germans from central and eastern Europe (*Aussiedler*) are not readily identified as such. Our attempt to reverse this research tradition not only has scientific implications (for example, making German data comparable to U.S. and Canadian data), but also could influence the general debate on immigration by making clear that a considerable number of Germany's citizens are foreign-born while many of its legal foreign residents are German-born.

The first emphasis of our article is to explain how today's population acquired German and/or foreign citizenship and to combine this information with data on place of birth. The second emphasis is a demographic analysis and explanation of both foreign and co-ethnic migration flows. In addition, this article analyzes several of the important structural characteristics of the foreign population in Germany and discusses recent changes in German citizenship law. In the conclusion, the article quantifies the influence of international migration on the demographic development of Germany.

I. Germans and Foreigners, Immigrants and German-Born

In 1997 Germany had 82 million inhabitants: 74.6 million were German citizens (including those holding dual citizenship), and 7.4 million residents did not have German citizenship. The share of the foreign nationals was therefore just over 9 percent of the total population. Of the German citizens, at least 1.9 million people hold a second citizenship (2.3 percent of the population).²⁴

The status of "foreigner" does not automatically mean that the person in question has immigrated to Germany, although this is now generally the case. Of the 7.4 million foreigners in Germany, approximately 6 million are foreign-born and therefore immigrants. Nevertheless, 1.4 million foreigners were born in Germany as the children (or grandchildren) of immigrants, but because of *jus sanguinis* citizenship laws (until 1999) hold the nationality of their parents. Therefore, only 81 percent of the foreign population in Germany are immigrants.

In contrast, most of the German citizens were born in Germany, but there are also German immigrants; the largest group are people who belonged to ethnic German minorities (*Volksdeutsche*) in central and eastern Europe, and who have come to Germany as *Aussiedler* since the 1950s. *Aussiedler* automatically acquire German citizenship upon migrating to Germany. Approximately 3.2 million *Aussiedler* currently live in Germany (3.9 percent of the total population). In addition, some 700,000 legal foreign residents have become naturalized German citizens over the past three decades.²⁵

Finally, Germany has a unique features associated with the massive population relocations of the Nazi period,²⁶ the change in borders after 1945, and the escape and expulsion of millions of ethnic Germans (*Ostdeutsche and Volksdeutsche*) between 1944 and 1948/49. The approximately 480,000 people who were relocated under the auspices of ethnic "return" programs organized by Nazi Germany (*Heim-ins-Reich*) all came from what was then and is now foreign territory, among them 375,000 from east central Europe. In addition, approximately 55 percent of the 12 million expellees from that period originally came from Germany's former eastern provinces.²⁷ Their place of birth lay within the 1937 pre-war borders of the German *Reich*. Today these places belong to either Poland or Russia (Kaliningrad).

Some 40 percent of the expellees were (at least prior to 1938-39) citizens of other countries or stateless persons who had ethnic German origins (*Volksdeutsche*). They originally came from regions that, at least before 1938, had not belonged to Germany. Their place of birth lay both then and today in foreign territory (that is, former Yugoslavia, Poland including Danzig, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and to a small extent also Romania). Another 525,000 people originally came from these regions and from the former Eastern provinces, but in 1945 were already living within Germany's present-day borders or had become POWs. They could not return to their regions of origin and were also considered in postwar Germany as expellees (5 percent of all expellees).

Although their migration was forced rather than voluntary, in a wider sense of the term these people can be considered as immigrants. It is estimated that in the mid-1990s approximately 3.6 million of the 1944-49 expellees and refugees from the East (*Vertriebene*)

as well as 130,000 of the displaced ethnic Germans (*Umsiedler* of 1939-42) were still alive and living in Germany.²⁸

Table 1: German Expellees (1944-45 to 1945-49) by Country of Origin and Area of Residence after the Expulsion; Transferred Ethnic Germans (1939 to 1944) by Country of Origin

Country	Expellees 1944-49		West Germany	East Germany with Berlin	Austria and other Western countries	Transferred ethnic Germans 1939-44**
	Total	(%)				
Former German territories	6,980	55.8	4,380	2,600	-	
Poland (with Danzig)	980	7.8	630	335	15	
Czechoslovakia	3,000	4.0	1,900	850	250	
USSR (with the Baltics)	270	2.2	180	55	10	140
Hungary	210	1.7	175	10	25	
Romania	250	2.0	145	60	45	200
Yugoslavia	300	2.4	150	35	115	35
Subtotal	11,990	95.8	7,560	3,945	460	375
Quasi expellees*	525	4.2	385	125	15	
Total	12,515	100.0	7,945	4,070	475	375

* Persons originating from territories where the expulsion took place, but who in 1945 lived in Germany (in its present-day borders) or who were POWs.

** This table does not include transferred ethnic Germans from South Tyrol/Alto Adige.

Source: Gerhard Reichling, *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen*, vol. 1. (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der Vertriebenen, 1986), 26.

When one adds up all these groups (*Aussiedler*, naturalized foreign migrants, and those expellees and displaced ethnic Germans, that is, *Vertriebene* and *Umsiedler* who are still alive) then 9.6 percent of the German citizens living in Germany (7.2 million people) immigrated from what today is foreign territory. Of them, 5 million were born outside the former German territories (6.7 percent of all German citizens) and some 2.2 million were born in former German territories annexed to Poland and Russia (2.9 percent of all German citizens).

In sum, this analysis shows that in 1997 approximately 13.3 million inhabitants of Germany (16.2 percent of the population) were born outside the borders of today's Germany. Naturally, not all of these people would consider themselves to be immigrants. A large portion

Table 2: Germany's Population according to Place of Birth and National Citizenship (Estimates for 1996-1997)

Citizenship	Place of birth			Population (million)
	Germany	German territory at time of birth; foreign territory today	Foreign territory both now and in the past	
German	Majority of Germans (with place of birth inside today's borders of Germany) Naturalized children of foreign migrants (who have relinquished their original citizenship)	The majority of expellees (people born as German citizens with place of birth in the German Reich's 1937 borders)	Ethnic German expellees (<i>Volksdeutsche</i> with place of birth outside the German Reich's 1937 borders) Displaced ethnic Germans of the period 1939-43 (<i>Umsiedler</i> with place of birth outside the borders of the German Reich) Ethnic German immigrants from central and eastern Europe (<i>Aussiedler</i> who have come since 1950 and who have relinquished their original citizenship) Naturalized foreign immigrants (who have relinquished their original citizenship)	72.7
German and a second citizenship (dual citizenship)	Germans by birth with one non-German parent Naturalized children of foreign immigrants (who were naturalized with toleration of dual citizenship) Naturalized children of foreign immigrants (who were naturalized after having re-acquired their original citizenship)		Ethnic German immigrants from central and eastern Europe (<i>Aussiedler</i> who have come since 1950 and who have retained or re-acquired their original citizenship) Naturalized foreign immigrants (who were naturalized with toleration of dual citizenship) Naturalized foreign immigrants (who have re-acquired their original citizenship)	2.0
Solely foreign	Children and grandchildren of foreign immigrants (with place of birth inside today's borders of Germany)		The majority of foreign immigrants (with place of birth in their country of origin)	7.3
Total (million)	68.7	2.2	11.1	82.0

Source: Authors' estimates

of expellees in particular might reject this categorization even though the fate of forced migration has shaped their lives and identities in many ways. And only some 40 percent of them were de facto born in a third country. In any case, *Aussiedler* as well as naturalized citizens and foreigners born outside of Germany can certainly all be counted as immigrants. All together these three groups consisted of 9.6 million people or 11.7 percent of the population of Germany in 1997. If expellees born in a third country are included, the foreign-born population reaches 10.9 million or 13.3 percent of the total population.

Table 3: Acquisition of German Citizenship or Dual Nationality

Acquisition	German Citizenship	Dual Nationality (German/Foreign)
By birth (<i>jus sanguinis</i> ; birthright citizenship)	Children of German parents (at least one German parent)	Children of bi-national couples Children of dual citizen parents
By ethnic descent (constitutional right, legal claim)	Ethnic German expellees (<i>Vertriebene</i>) of 1944-48 without German citizenship (collectively naturalized in 1949) Ethnic German immigrants (<i>Aussiedler</i>) from central and eastern Europe (individually naturalized upon arrival in Germany since 1950)	Ethnic German immigrants (<i>Aussiedler</i>) who came since 1990 and were not forced to relinquish their original citizenship Ethnic German immigrants (<i>Aussiedler</i>) who successfully reclaimed their original citizenship
By ethnic descent (constitutional right, legal claim)	Former German citizens (stateless) who were expatriated and successfully reclaimed their original citizenship	Former German citizens (meanwhile naturalized by another country) who were expatriated and successfully reclaimed their original citizenship Citizens of other countries who were naturalized by Nazi authorities (predominantly Volksliste III + IV) and successfully reclaimed German citizenship; children of this group of people
By fulfilling residency requirements in Germany (legal claim, discretion of local authorities)	Foreigners (regardless of place of birth) who relinquished their original citizenship upon naturalization in Germany	Foreigners (regardless of place of birth) who are naturalized in Germany while maintaining (or reclaiming) their original citizenship
By place of birth (<i>jus soli</i> ; birthright citizenship)		Conditional <i>jus soli</i> (after January 1, 2000): children born in Germany to legal foreign residents; option to become a German citizen or to remain German by renouncing other nationalities between age 18 and age 23

Source: Grundgesetz, Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, Ausländergesetz, Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts.

It is worth noting that only approximately 66 million out of 82 million inhabitants of Germany represent the “normal” case, that is, were always German citizens, were never citizens of another country, and were born within the borders of today’s Germany.

Today the following groups can be distinguished:


1. The large majority of people living in Germany today acquired German citizenship by virtue of being born to parents who were citizens either of the German *Reich*, of the Federal Republic of Germany, or of the GDR. This majority became citizens at birth because of their descent (*jus sanguinis*).
2. The second largest group of German citizens today are those who came to Germany as *Aussiedler* and therefore acquired German citizenship quasi-automatically (a total of 3.9 million people since 1950, of whom 3.2 million²⁹ live in Germany today). Their citizenship is based on their ethnic origin. This path to German citizenship gained significance during the years 1988-97. The majority of those ethnic Germans who immigrated since 1990 are de facto dual citizens because Russia, Khazakhstan, Poland and Romania no longer forced them to relinquish their first nationality when leaving the country of origin.
3. The third largest group of Germans are those expellees (*Vertriebene*) who came as non-citizens (*Volksdeutsche*) to one of the allied occupation zones and in 1949 became citizens of either the Federal Republic or the GDR (at that time a total of almost 5 million people; approximately 1.4 million were still alive in 1997). These people became German citizens on the basis of the German constitution.³⁰
4. Only the fourth largest group of German citizens is composed of those people who first come to mind when one thinks of “naturalization”: the 700,000 foreigners who became naturalized German citizens over the past three decades. Approximately two-thirds of this group are immigrants and one-third are children of foreign migrants born in Germany. They acquired citizenship either by discretion or a legal claim.³¹ In 1997 some 600,000 of this group of naturalized citizens of foreign origin were still present in Germany.

Table 4: Naturalizations of Foreigners and Ethnic Germans, 1974-1998

Year	Ethnic Germans	Foreigners	% of Legal Foreign Residents
1974	12,256	12,488	0.3
1975	14,198	10,727	0.3
1976	16,347	13,134	0.3
1977	18,097	13,535	0.3
1978	18,635	14,075	0.4
1979	19,780	15,172	0.4
1980	22,034	14,969	0.3
1981	22,235	13,643	0.3
1982	26,014	13,266	0.3
1983	25,151	14,334	0.3
1984	23,351	14,695	0.3
1985	21,019	13,894	0.3
1986	22,616	14,030	0.3
1987	23,781	14,029	0.3
1988	30,123	16,660	0.4
1989	50,794	17,742	0.4
1990	81,140	20,237	0.4
1991	114,335	27,295	0.5
1992	142,862	37,042	0.6
1993	125,385	74,058	1.1
1994	197,500	61,700	0.9
1995	241,625	71,981	1.0
1996	216,474	86,356	1.2
1997	195,749	82,913	1.1
1998		106,790	1.5

Sources: Harald W. Lederer, *Migration und Integration in Zahlen: Ein Handbuch*, Forum Migration 4, Der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen (Bonn/Berlin, 1997), 60; Statistisches Bundesamt, *106,790 Einbürgerungen von Ausländern im Jahr 1998*, press release of 23 November 1999, <http://www.statistik-bund.de/presse/deutsch/pm/p9400025.htm>.

Figure 1: Naturalization of Foreigners (without *Aussiedler*) by Nationality, 1996



Data: Der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, *Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation*, 17th ed. (Bonn, March 1998), 32.

For a long time, quantitatively speaking, the naturalization of foreigners with long-term legal residence in Germany played a minor role (for example, 1975: 10,727 cases; 1983: 14,334 cases: see Table 4). A significant increase occurred only with a change in the naturalization provisions of the Foreigners' Law. As a result of these changes, the number of foreigners who became naturalized German citizens rose from 37,042 in 1992 to 86,353 in 1996. Despite this increase, it should not be forgotten that so far only a little more than 1 percent of all foreigners living in Germany are naturalized annually. Almost one-quarter of them (1996: 23 percent) became dual citizens because they were allowed to keep their first nationality. In comparison with other countries, Germany's rate of naturalization is very low if one does not take ethnic Germans into account.

By far the largest group of foreigners who become naturalized today are Turkish citizens. In 1996 this group made up 54 percent of all naturalizations of foreigners, although only 28 percent of all foreigners living in Germany are Turkish citizens. In contrast, citizens of Bosnia, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as citizens from EU countries, only rarely become naturalized German citizens.

Until 1992, foreigners had no legal claim to become German citizens but naturalization was possible after fifteen years of legal residence; the decision remained at the discretion of the authorities. Between 1993 and 1999, foreigners could naturalize after ten years of legal residence. Foreign immigrants had a right to acquire German citizenship only after fifteen years of residence; the same applied to young adults (age sixteen to twenty-three) born or raised in Germany after eight years of residence. Starting in 2000, adult foreign migrants who have legally resided in Germany for more than eight years (until 1999, fifteen years), and children who were born or raised in Germany and have already resided in the country for more than five years (until 1999, eight years) have a legal claim to German citizenship. For foreigners married to a German citizen this waiting period is reduced to three years (until 1999, five years) if the marriage has lasted for at least two years.

A new regulation concerns those children born in Germany whose foreign parents are legal residents of Germany ("second generation" immigrants). Until 1999—according to Germany's citizenship laws—these children automatically became foreign citizens.

Beginning in 2000, they not only inherit the nationality of their parents but also become German citizens if at least one of their parents has lived in Germany for eight or more years and has acquired a "stable" residence permit (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*, or unlimited *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). But in order to avoid permanent dual citizenship they have the obligation to opt for either German or other citizenship at age eighteen to twenty-three (temporary dual citizenship). This represents an important departure from the dominant principle of passing on German citizenship primarily by descent (*jus sanguinis*). For the first time, access to German citizenship is given to a group of people on territorial principles, that is, because they are born in Germany (*jus soli*).

In its coalition agreement in September 1998, the SPD/Green government announced a new regulation of citizenship law but denied the need for an immigration law. A key element of the planned regulations was the introduction of *jus soli*. Under the provisions of the coalition agreement almost all German-born children of foreign parents would have received German citizenship if at least one of their parents had been born in Germany, immigrated to Germany at an age younger than fourteen or had held a "stable" residence permit (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). A second element foreseen by the coalition agreement (and implemented meanwhile) was a further lowering of the waiting time requirements for naturalization. The third element was probably the most controversial: a general acceptance of dual citizenship. According to the coalition agreement, a regulation was planned whereby foreigners would not have had to give up their current citizenship in order to become Germans. This regulation would probably have increased applications for naturalization substantially and would have changed the citizenship structure of Germany's population as well as the electorate for nationwide and state elections within a few years.

The conservative opposition (CDU/CSU) started a petition campaign against dual citizenship in early 1999, arguing that it would devalue German citizenship and that the integration of immigrants requires a conscious decision in favor of German citizenship at the expense of their original citizenship. Interestingly, the argument of a "toll-free" naturalization had not been raised before in the context of ethnic Germans, most of whom keep their previous citizenship after

automatic naturalization in Germany. Within a few months CDU and CSU were able to collect five million signatures against this component of the new citizenship law proposed by the Red/Green government.

More importantly, the campaign against dual citizenship helped to influence the outcome of the elections in Hesse. With the new CDU/FDP government in the state of Hesse, the balance of power in the German *Bundesrat* changed. After that, the SPD/Greens federal government had no chance to get the new citizenship law confirmed in the *Bundesrat* in its previous draft. A compromise with the FDP (or the CDU/CSU) had to be found. The compromise (*Optionsmodell*) was included in the new law on the reform of citizenship (*Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts*). It passed the German parliament (*Bundestag*) on May 7, 1999, with a majority of 365 votes from SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, and parts of the post-communist PDS; 184 members of parliament from CDU/CSU and PDS voted against this law and 39 abstained. The new law passed the *Bundesrat* on May 21, 1999, and came into effect on January 1, 2000.

The new law still contains a modified *jus soli*, but no longer a general acceptance of dual citizenship. Children with two foreign parents born in Germany receive German citizenship if at least one parent has been a legal resident of Germany for eight years or more and has obtained a certain category of "stable" residence permit (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*, or an unlimited *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* for at least three years). Although these children become German citizens at birth, they have to decide to keep German citizenship and drop other citizenships between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three—or lose German citizenship at age twenty-three. In this way, dual citizenship as a general pattern could be avoided. Children of foreigners born in Germany between 1990 and 1999 can acquire German citizenship upon application of their parents, but also have to decide between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three.³²

The conditions given in the new law restrict the application of *jus soli* substantially. By the end of 1997, there were 4.1 million foreigners who had lived eight years or longer in Germany and 3.4 million foreigners (47 percent of the foreign population) had acquired "stable" residence permits. Most, but not all, of the latter had lived in Germany long enough to qualify. On the other hand, the law requires that only one parent fulfill the conditions. It will take a few years

before the number of children of foreign parents to whom the new *jus soli* citizenship actually applies is known. It remains to be seen whether the number of foreigners applying for naturalization will increase with the reduction of the waiting period (eight years for adults, five years for foreigners who grew up in Germany).

However, it is obvious that the new citizenship reform will have an impact on the structure of Germany's population only in the long run. The effect of the new law has been modeled for a population projection according to citizenship. Given an extrapolation of past trends in immigration, fertility, and mortality, there will be a foreign population of 9.8 million in Germany by 2030. In other words, about 12.6 percent of the population of Germany would be excluded from voting and other privileges related to German citizenship. If the old *jus sanguinis* regulations had been maintained and all other assumptions remained equal, the foreign population would have risen to 11.4 million (14.7 percent).

The new law contributes substantially to the modernization of Germany's citizenship law. However, for the next decades it will contribute only marginally to the integration of Germany's large immigrant population. Given the size of the immigrant population and current demographic trends, much more remains to be done.

Ethnic Structure

The analysis of place of birth and nationality provides only limited information about the ethnic composition of Germany's population. In any case, the following is clear: the overwhelming majority of Germans born in Germany are considered to be both linguistically and culturally—and therefore also ethnically—German. Additionally, there are three recognized autochthon linguistic minorities: Slavic Sorbs in Upper Lausitz (Saxony) and Lower Lausitz (Brandenburg), ethnic Danes in Northern Schleswig-Holstein, and Frisians living along Lower Saxony's and Schleswig-Holstein's North Sea coast and on the Frisian islands.³³ In addition, since the Jewish population of Germany³⁴ enjoys a high degree of not only religious but also institutional and cultural autonomy, it may also justifiably be referred to as an ethno-religious minority. This holds true to a lesser degree for Germany's autochthon Gypsies (Roma and Sinti). Undoubtedly, a portion of naturalized foreigners are also ethnically distinct from the

majority of Germans. In contrast to the indigenous minorities, however, naturalized foreigners are not given any minority rights.

As in the case of naturalized Germans, there is also no clear relationship between foreigners' ethnic identity and their country of origin. This is most clearly recognizable in the case of Turkish citizens (ethnic Turks, Kurds), citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Montenegrans, Kosovo Albanians, Roma) and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Serbs). But even an Italian citizen in Germany can be either ethnically Italian or a German-speaking South Tyrolian (and therefore ethnically German).

II. Immigration of Foreigners to Germany

Even prior to World War II, there were phases of increased immigration of laborers from other European countries. The 1910 census counted 1.3 million foreigners in Germany. Of this group, 50 percent were Austrian citizens (mainly from Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia), 11 percent Dutch, and 11 percent citizens of Czarist Russia (mainly from the Russian parts of Poland and the Baltics). Migration from neighboring countries also took place during the interwar period. Of the 1 million foreigners in 1925, 27 percent came originally from Poland, 23 percent from Czechoslovakia, and 14 percent from Austria.³⁵

During World War II, the German war economy could to a considerable extent only be maintained with the employment of foreign workers and forced laborers.³⁶ By 1944/45 the number of foreigners who had been forced to work in Germany had risen to almost 8 million.³⁷ In addition to this group of foreigners, were the prisoners of war and the survivors of concentration camps. The majority of these foreigners either voluntarily returned or were forcibly returned to their homelands in 1945/46.³⁸ Others emigrated to Israel or overseas. Only a few remained as displaced persons in Germany. At the same time return migration of Jewish and other emigrants who had left the country during the years 1933-39/40 was very low.

In the first years after World War II, shortage of housing and high unemployment rates made the economic and social integration of expellees and war returnees difficult. However, with the start of the

unprecedented economic growth (the "economic miracle"), the demand for labor grew sharply in the 1950s. Unemployment quickly fell, and both expellees and citizens of the GDR who had migrated to West Germany were integrated in large numbers into the West German economy.³⁹


Despite the large number of expellees and the annual immigration of 200,000 to 300,000 GDR citizens, already by the 1950s some sectors of the West German economy were not able to satisfy their demands on the domestic labor market. West German industry thus began to recruit workers in southern Europe.⁴⁰ In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a bilateral agreement with Italy, and in short succession in the 1960s, with Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968).⁴¹

At first these agreements were of little relevance. During Germany's "economic miracle" of the 1950s, employment expanded initially through a decrease in unemployment rates and through the integration of ex-GDR citizens. In 1950 there were only approximately 72,000 foreign workers in Germany. In 1960 there were 329,000, and almost half were Italians (144,000). Only after the construction of the Berlin Wall was there a noticeable increase in the employment of foreigners as the West German economy stepped up the recruitment of foreign workers. Already in 1964 the one millionth guest worker, a Portuguese national, arrived in Germany—and got a warm and widely publicized welcome. In addition to Italy (296,000), Greece (155,000) and Spain (151,000) also became important countries of recruitment. By the end of 1964 the total number of foreigners in Germany was around 1.2 million (2.1 percent of the total population). By 1970 the number of foreigners had reached 3 million (5 percent of the total West German population). In 1973 almost 4 million foreigners lived in West Germany (7 percent of the population).

The aim of recruitment was not the formulation of a coherent migration policy similar to the French or American model, but rather to counterbalance the bottlenecks in the West German labor market created by a conjuncture of both economic and demographic trends. Foreigners were recruited for particular work places and brought to Germany on a temporary basis. This policy explains the

high annual level of immigration and return migration in the 1960s and early 1970s (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Migration of Foreigners to and from Germany, 1955-1998 (in 1000s)



Note: Emigration includes return migration.

Data: Until 1991 West Germany only.

Sources: Lederer, *Migration und Integration in Zahlen*, 180-81; Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1999 auf CD-ROM* (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 1999).

The year 1973 became a drastic turning point in the migration of foreigners to Germany. The German government first tripled the fees that employers had to pay for the recruitment of guest workers. After the OPEC oil embargo, the West German government ended the recruitment of foreigners in October 1973.

The recruitment stop did limit migration in the short-term, but in the medium-term it did not produce the desired results. In some cases, the measures produced some completely unintended consequences. This is especially true with regard to both the structure of immigration and its dependence on economic cycles.⁴²

During the 1974-75 recession there was once again a decrease in immigration and a slight increase in return migration. But already in

1976 the level of immigration began to increase, and return migration decreased.

In 1980, 4.5 million foreigners lived in Germany (7 percent of the population). There were 2.1 million foreign workers; most numerous were those from Turkey (592,000), Yugoslavia (357,000), and Italy (309,000). In the following years the number of foreigners declined only slightly, despite the recession of the early 1980s (1985: 4.4 million foreigners), although the number of foreign workers sank significantly (1985: 1.6 million). In this period (1983-84) the German government attempted to promote the return migration of labor migrants by offering financial incentives.

A new wave of immigration set in after 1987, spurred by a rising number of asylum seekers, the fall of the Iron Curtain, war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and the growing violence in Kurdish regions of Turkey and northern Iraq. For these reasons, the bulk of migration was for a time shifted from labor migration and family reunion to asylum seekers. At the beginning of the 1970s the portion of those seeking asylum was less than 1 percent of total foreign migration to Germany. By the beginning of the 1990s the number had risen to more than 30 percent. The wave of arriving asylum seekers reached its peak in 1992: during that single year, 438,200 people or 63 percent of all asylum seekers in western Europe, applied for asylum in Germany.

After the annual number of asylum applicants surpassed 100,000 in the late 1980s, the nature of this migration and the potential for controlling it became central themes in German domestic politics. The result of this debate was the so-called Asylum Compromise of 1993,⁴³ which created two new barriers to applying for political asylum in Germany. First, asylum seekers who traveled to Germany from other EU member states or other "safe third states" could be sent back immediately and without a court hearing. Second, a simplified asylum procedure was instated for applicants from countries that were considered to be "free of persecution,"⁴⁴ which in most cases meant an immediate rejection of the application and possible deportation.

The change in the German constitution and the more restrictive practices obviously had the desired effect: the number of asylum applications was already lowered by the second half of 1993. Whereas

224,000 asylum seekers had come to Germany in the first half of 1993, only 98,000 asylum applications were registered in the second half of the year. In 1997 only 104,000 people applied for asylum, 17 percent of that year's total migrants.

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in southeastern Turkey, and in northern Iraq were not only reflected in the statistics on asylum applications; in the case of Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, the conflicts also prompted a larger number of legal foreign residents from both countries to bring more of their family members to Germany.

Economic growth during the late 1980s, the short economic boom of 1990-91 resulting from German unification, and emigration incentives in the sending countries all led to the recruitment of new foreign workers. It is within this context that new groups of foreign workers appeared in Germany. These workers came primarily from Poland and the Czech Republic, but also from other eastern European states, and included people with a limited employment contract, seasonal workers (that is, harvesters), cross-border commuters, and those who came (and come) to Germany explicitly for professional training. New possibilities for legal migration and temporary employment were created for central and eastern European seasonal workers, contract labor, guest workers or cross-border commuters.⁴⁵ Most of these programs are seen as a means to stabilize Germany's eastern neighbors by creating additional income for their citizens and by transferring skills. In any case, during the 1990s, remittances of central and eastern European labor migrants temporarily working in Germany exceeded foreign direct investment.

The late 1990s again reversed the migration pattern. Both in 1997 and in 1998 the number of foreigners emigrating or returning from Germany exceeded the number of foreign immigrants for the first time since 1984.

In 1964 one million foreigners lived in Germany; in early 1998 the number of foreigners was already 7.4 million. Between 1954 and 1997 a total of 24 million foreigners migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany. Approximately 17.4 million foreigners left Germany during this period. The resulting migration balance is a net gain of 6.6 million people since the mid-1950s. Minus the number of naturalized citizens⁴⁶ and the number of deaths, this is the foreign-born foreign population of Germany (1998: 6.0 million).

Table 5: Migration between Germany and Other Countries, 1954-1997 (in 1,000s)

	Immigration			Emigration/ Return Migration			Migration Balance		
	Total	German	Foreign	Total	German	Foreign	Total	German	Foreign
1954-61	1,923	633	1,290	1,440	818	622	483	-185	668
1962-73	9,137	830	8,307	5,953	832	5,121	3,184	-3	3,187
1974-87	7,389	1,266	6,124	6,968	795	6,173	421	471	-49
1988-91	4,450	1,274	3,176	2,130	370	1,760	2,319	904	1,415
1992-97	6,759	1,664	5,095	4,426	707	3,718	2,333	957	1,376
1954-97	29,657	5,666	23,991	20,917	3,522	17,394	8,740	2,144	6,597

Note: "German" includes ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*); "Foreign" includes asylum seekers and Bosnians with temporary protection (TPS).


Data: Lederer, *Migration und Integration in Zahlen*, 180-181; Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1999*.

III. Structure of the Foreign Population

Until 1970 almost half of all foreigners in Germany were originally from one of today's EU member states, in the early days especially from Italy, Greece, Spain, or Austria. Only after 1970 did Turks and ex-Yugoslavs become the two most important groups of foreigners. In 1997, citizens of other EU countries constituted no more than 25 percent of the foreign population. By far the largest group of foreigners in 1997 were the 2.1 million Turkish citizens (29 percent of the foreign population); next were the 1.3-1.4 million citizens of FR Yugoslavia, Bosnians, Croats (19 percent, including Bosnian war refugees living in Germany under temporary protection),⁴⁷ followed by Italians (8 percent) and Greeks (5 percent). Since the mid-1970s the percentage of Greeks and Italians has decreased substantially. In contrast, the proportion of Poles living in Germany in recent times has grown to almost 4 percent.⁴⁸

Today the foreigners with the most secure legal status are those 25 percent who come from other EU countries.⁴⁹ They have almost unlimited access to the German labor market, and have the right to settle in Germany, provided they have either a regular income or other means of support, and are not dependent on social welfare. Other groups with a similar status include foreigners who have a permanent residence permit (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*, 1996-97: 12 per-

Figure 3: Foreigners in Germany according to Citizenship, 1997
(in %)



Data: Der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, *Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation*, 18th ed. (June 1999), 25.

cent of all foreigners) or those who have a limited or unlimited residence permit (*Aufenthaltslaubnis*: 17 percent, excluding EU citizens). In 1996-97, another 3 percent of all foreigners were in Germany for a specific purpose and could legally reside in the country for a limited period of time;⁵⁰ 5 percent of all foreigners were waiting for a decision on their asylum application;⁵¹ approximately 7 percent of all foreigners in 1996-97 had a temporary right to residence (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis*) because of humanitarian reasons (among them, "humanitarian quota" refugees), or were tolerated as de facto refugees who could not be deported for humanitarian, political or legal reasons.⁵² Another 3 percent of foreigners in 1996-97 were, in the view of the authorities, required to leave the country, but had not yet done so.

IV. Migration and Structure of Ethnic German Immigrants

At the end of World War II and in the immediate postwar years, most of the migrants who came to the country were refugees and expellees from the eastern parts of the German *Reich*, as well as from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. By the end of

the 1940s a total of approximately 12 million Germans (both German citizens and ethnic Germans) had come to the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR and Austria.⁵³ In relative terms, these immigrants played a somewhat larger role for the GDR (4 million, or 22 percent of the total population) than for the FRG (7.9 million, or 16 percent of the total population; see Table 1).⁵⁴

The immigration of ethnic Germans from central and eastern Europe (*Aussiedler*) continued at a lower level between 1950 and 1987 (see Figure 4).⁵⁵ Only the late 1980s and early 1990s brought a substantial increase in the number of *Aussiedler*. Until 1997, almost 3.8 million *Aussiedler* had immigrated to Germany. Upon arrival, *Aussiedler* have a legal claim to German citizenship. They are entitled to a number of social benefits. Thus, at least in the past, *Aussiedler* were in a better position than most foreign immigrants.⁵⁶

For most *Aussiedler*, the possibility of migrating was made possible prior to 1988-89 by bilateral agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Soviet governments. Migration was characterized by a higher degree of voluntarism than that of the expellees during 1945-48, and generally only came about when the persons concerned had applied for it. In this context, it is meaningful to make a distinction between the groups of earlier ethnic German immigrants (*Aussiedler*, 1950-1992), the last generation of ethnic German immigrants (*Spätaussiedler*, since 1993), and ethnic German expellees (*Vertriebene*, 1945-48). Prior to 1990 a large portion of the German public interpreted the decision of ethnic Germans to leave their traditional settlement areas as a response to political and social discrimination, combined with their strong identification with the German culture and the West German political system. Only a few scholars saw them motivated primarily by greater opportunities in the West.⁵⁷

After the end of organized relocation and expulsion during the 1940s there was a period of time in which ethnic German migration was reduced to a few cases of family unification. In 1950, it still stood at 47,000 but had dropped by 1952 to only 5,000 cases. During the next thirty-five years (1953-87) a yearly average of 37,000 *Aussiedler* came to Germany. Fluctuations in the annual number of ethnic German migrants was caused on the one hand by periods of domestic liberalization (Poland in the second half of the 1950s; Czechoslova-


kia, 1967-68; USSR after 1986) and on the other hand was attributable to the governments of Poland and Romania using permission to emigrate as a lever with which they could either improve their political relationship with West Germany or acquire economic and financial assistance. At the same time, there was seemingly the hope that ethnic minority groups in the country would be weakened through emigration. All of these factors played a role in the 1950s, when approximately 250,000 people of German or mixed ethnicity were allowed to leave Poland for Germany. Also, in the periods before and immediately following the conclusion of the State Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*) between Bonn and Warsaw (1970-71), the number of *Aussiedler* from Poland was almost five times what it was in 1968-69. In the case of Romania, the Federal Republic in 1978 even started to pay for every *Aussiedler* who was allowed to leave for Germany.

Between 1950 and 1987, 62 percent of the *Aussiedler* came from Poland (848,000), and a further 15 percent came from Romania (206,000). Although there was also a strong German minority in the Soviet Union, during that period (1950-87) only 110,000 (8 percent of *Aussiedler*) were allowed to leave the country (see Figure 4). Even with emigration, the biggest portion of the German minorities continued to live in their traditional areas of settlement (Upper Silesia, Transylvania, Banat), or in regions to which they were forcibly displaced during World War II (that is, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan).

With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the removal of administrative restrictions on travel in central and eastern Europe, barriers to migration for *Aussiedler* in the late 1980s also disappeared. As a consequence, their number increased significantly. From 1988 to 1997, a total of 2.4 million *Aussiedler* immigrated to Germany. During this phase, the majority of *Aussiedler* came from the former Soviet Union/CIS states (1,570,000 *Aussiedler* or 66 percent).⁵⁸ The second most important country of origin for ethnic German *Aussiedler* during this period was Poland (1988-97: 593,000 or 25 percent), and Romania was third (1988-97: 220,000 or 9 percent).

For decades, those belonging to German diasporas in central and eastern Europe had not been allowed to leave their countries legally, but according to German law had been free to travel to Germany and apply for German citizenship. The fast and unbureaucratic process of acquiring citizenship made it possible for *Aussiedler* to stay

Figure 4: Immigration of Ethnic Germans to the FRG by Country of Origin, 1950-1998 (in 1000s)



Source: Münz and Ohliger, *Deutsche Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Osteuropa*, 7.

in the country right away, even if they had not entered as regular immigrants. With the beginning of the 1990s, Germany reacted to the liberalization of migration regimes in central and eastern Europe, and the strong increase in the number of *Aussiedler* by instituting a number of restrictions. Since July 1, 1990, ethnic Germans must apply for an entry permit for Germany before they leave their home countries. Additionally, application decisions are no longer made quickly or without red tape. By 1991, these regulations reduced the immigration of *Aussiedler* to 221,000 (1990: 397,000), and produced a backlog of pending applications. In 1992 an annual quota for the immigration of *Aussiedler* (225,000 p.a.) was set. Indeed, in 1994, 222,000 *Aussiedler* came to Germany; in 1996 only 178,000; in 1997, 134,000; and in 1998 only 103,000. There are several reasons for this decrease.

According to the new laws, only ethnic Germans who live in the successor states of the former Soviet Union have an unconditional claim to immigration to Germany. The requirement that ethnic Germans demonstrate their knowledge of the German language before leaving their country of origin also serves to restrict the flow of

Aussiedler to Germany. If they are unable to do so, their status as *Aussiedler* can be denied.⁵⁹ An end to ethnically privileged migration to Germany is foreseeable. A law dealing with so-called late consequences of World War II, the *Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz* of 1992, states that only people who were born before January 1, 1993, are entitled to individually apply for admittance to Germany. This provision will only have an effect, however, when ethnic Germans born after January 1, 1993, reach adulthood after the year 2010. But these people will still be able to come to Germany, even after 2010, within the context of family reunion.

V. Conclusion

Between 1954 and 1998, a total of 29.7 million Germans and foreigners migrated to Germany. Of this number, 3.8 million were *Aussiedler* and 2.7 million were asylum seekers and refugees. During the same period, 20.9 million Germans and foreigners left the country. In the case of Germans, emigration dominated in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Since that time immigration has become dominant because of the privileged status of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) from eastern Europe. For foreigners, there was more emigration than immigration in the mid-1970s, the first half of the 1980s, and in 1997-98. In all other periods since 1954 immigration predominated. Net foreign immigration was especially high from 1962 to 1973, and between 1988 and 1996. On balance, the net number of foreigners who have migrated to Germany is 6.6 million (1954-97), and the net number of Germans (mostly *Aussiedler*) is 2.1 million. Altogether this means that since the mid-1950s Germany has gained a net number of 8.7 million new residents through international migration. Since a considerable portion of immigrants, especially foreign immigrants, have had children, migration has also made a significant indirect contribution to population growth in Germany.

The positive migration balance compensates for Germany's negative birth rate since the 1970s. Without immigration, Germany's population would already have been in decline for the past two decades. This correlation will only become stronger in the coming decades. Germany's native population is expected to shrink in the coming

decades, even though the trend of increased naturalization may slow down this process. The number of foreigners or people of foreign origin will further increase through immigration, but also through a growing number of children born in Germany whose parents are of foreign origin.

This article has shown that Germany has been a country of immigration over the past decades. However, the demographically important impact of immigration was not matched by parallel attempts to also absorb migrants. Only expellees and ethnic Germans immigrating prior to the 1990s profited from state-financed integration measures or compensation for lost property. More recent ethnic German immigrants as well as the majority of foreigners from Mediterranean countries remained politically, socially, and economically in marginal positions. Compared to international figures, naturalization rates in Germany were and still are very low. The results of this marginalization are obvious: on average, foreigners and recent ethnic German immigrants have higher unemployment rates, lower educational achievements, higher concentration in lower socio-economic strata, and higher use of social welfare benefits than the native German population.

The new law on citizenship (*Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts*) brings substantial changes to the legal setting of citizenship in Germany, even though its real impact will not be felt for a couple of years. Until then, the law has important symbolic value. However, Germany presently has no instrument to manage the overall impact of various migration streams. A new immigration law is still far from implementation.

Notes

1. This article is based on research financially supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Fiona Adamson and Antje Scheidler were helpful in editing early versions of this article.
2. Some 7.0 million ethnic German expellees came from former German territories (Pomerania, East Brandenburg, East Prussia, Upper and Lower Silesia); another 4.9 million were expelled by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Another 0.5 million people originating from these regions, but in 1945 living in Germany in its present-day borders or as POWs on Allied territory could not return (second degree expellees). See Table 1.
3. Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, eds., *Die Vertriebenen in Deutschland* (Kiel, 1959).
4. German researchers first became interested in these groups in the 1970s. For more on migration research in Germany, see Steffen Angenendt, *Ausländerforschung in Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen und inhaltliche Entwicklung eines aktuellen Forschungsberichtes* (Frankfurt/M.-New York, 1992); Ursula Mehrländer, *Ausländerforschung 1965 bis 1980: Fragestellungen, theoretische Ansätze, empirische Ergebnisse* (Bonn, 1987).
5. For example, Hartmut Esser, *Aspekte der Wanderungssoziologie: Assimilation und Integration von Wanderern, ethnischen Gruppen und Minderheiten. Eine handlungstheoretische Analyse* (Darmstadt-Neuwied, 1980); Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, *Migration: Ein Beitrag zu einer soziologischen Erklärung* (Stuttgart, 1970); Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, *Soziologie des Fremdarbeiterproblems: Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse am Beispiel der Schweiz* (Stuttgart, 1973); Mehrländer (see note 4).
6. Klaus J. Bade, "Die Ausländerbeschäftigung in der Bundesrepublik zwischen Arbeitswanderung und Einwanderung: Einführung," in Klaus J. Bade, ed., *Auswanderer - Wanderarbeiter - Gastarbeiter* (Ostfeldern, 1984), 621-624; Knuth Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer und bürgerlicher Staat* (Königstein, 1981); Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880-1990* (Berlin-Bonn, 1986); Helmut Heyden, "Kontinuität und Diskontinuität der Ausländerpolitik," in Johannes C. Papalekas, ed., *Strukturwandel des Ausländerproblems* (Bochum, 1986), 72-80; Peter Luettinger, "Der Mythos der schnellen Integration: Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Integration der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1971," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 1 (1986): 20-36.
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9. Kay Hailbronner, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura, eds., *Immigration Admissions: The Search for Workable Policies in Germany and the United States* (Providence, RI, 1998a); Kay Hailbronner, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura, eds., *Immigration Control: The Search for Workable Policies in Germany and the*

United States (Providence, RI, 1998b); Christian Klos, *Rahmenbedingungen und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der europäischen Migrationspolitik* (Constance, 1998); Bernhard Santel, *Migration in und nach Europa: Erfahrungen, Strukturen, Politik* (Opladen, 1995).

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14. Hans Grüner, *Mobilität und Diskriminierung: Deutsche und ausländische Arbeiter auf dem Arbeitsmarkt* (Frankfurt/M.-New York, 1992); Helmut Grillmeister, Hermann Kurthen and Jürgen Fijalkowski, *Ausländerbeschäftigung in der Krise? Die Beschäftigungschancen und -risiken ausländischer Arbeitnehmer am Beispiel der West-Berliner Industrie* (Berlin, 1989).
15. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, ed., *Was hält eine multi-ethnische Gesellschaft zusammen?* (Frankfurt/M., 1996).
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20. Klaus F. Zimmermann, ed., *The Economics of Migration* (Aldershot, 1998); Lutz Reyher and Hans-Uwe Bach, "Der Potential-Effekt der Zuwanderungen - Eine Arbeitskräfte-Gesamtrechnung für Aus- und Übersiedler," *Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung* 4 (1989): 468-471; Johannes Velling, *Zuwanderer auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Sind die neuen Migranten die "Gastarbeiter" der neunziger Jahre?* (Mannheim, 1994).
21. Reiner Hans Dinkel and Uwe Lebok, "Demographische Aspekte der vergangenen und zukünftigen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung *Das Parlament*), 1994, B48/94, 27-36; Joachim Sprink and Wolfgang Hellmann, "Finanzielle Belastung oder ökonomisches Potential - Regional unterschiedliche Konsequenzen des Ausländerzustroms," in *Informationen zur Raumentwicklung* 5 (1989): 323-329.
22. Ralf Ulrich, "Foreigners and the Social Insurance System in Germany," in Steinmann and Ulrich (see note 4).
23. Klaus J. Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland - Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich, 1992); Klaus J. Bade, *Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl* (Munich, 1994); Siegfried Bethlehem, *Heimatvertreibung, DDR-Flucht, Gastarbeiter, Zuwanderung, Wanderungsströme und Wanderungspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1982); Günther Gugel, *Ausländer, Aussiedler, Übersiedler* (Tübingen, 1990); Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, ed., *Ausländer, Aussiedler und Einheimische als Nachbarn: Ermittlung von Konfliktpotentialen und exemplarischen Konfliktlösungen* (Wuppertal, 1992).
24. This is significantly more than the 520,000 people who indicated in the Microcensus that they had dual citizenship. The ALLBUS survey also shows too few people by far with dual citizenship (1996: 0.5 percent of those surveyed). The largest group of dual citizens are *Aussiedler*, who since the collapse of the Soviet Union and political liberalization in Poland and Romania are no longer required to (and no longer do) give up their citizenship before leaving for Germany (1996-97: ca. 1.1 million). The second largest group are Germans born in Germany who have one German and one non-German parent (1960-1997: almost 1 million people). Of this group, approximately 650,000 (1997) may hold dual citizenship. In third place are those of foreign descent naturalized under conditions that tolerated multiple citizenship (by 1997: ca. 190,000 people).
25. It is surmised that approximately one-third of naturalized citizens were born in Germany, and two-thirds are immigrants. There is increasing tolerance for naturalization that results in dual citizenship (1996: 23 percent).
26. In 1939-42 this affected primarily ethnic Germans from the Baltics, South Tyrol (i.e., the Italian province of Alto Adige), Wolhynia, Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Crimea.
27. Pomerania, East Brandenburg, Upper and Lower Silesia and East Prussia.
28. This estimate is based on information gathered from German respondents to the 1996 ALLBUS survey who were 47 years old or older and whose place of birth is in the regions mentioned (12.1 percent Germans born prior to 1949 in the ALLBUS random sample). This ratio was then projected onto the overall German population age 47 years and older, creating information that cannot be found in official statistics. An estimated 2.2 million expellees still alive in 1996 were born within the 1937 borders of the German Reich (i.e., as German citizens) and 1.4 million were born in other countries.
29. The difference between a total inflow of 3.9 million and a current stock of 3.2 million is due to mortality and emigration/re-migration of *Aussiedler*.
30. Provisional constitution (*Grundgesetz*) Art 116 (1) drafted in 1948 and in force since 1949.
31. Foreigner's law (*Ausländergesetz*) §§ 85, 86 in combination with the law on citizenship (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*).
32. Ralf Ulrich, "The Reform of German Citizenship Law," (Policy Issue Brief for AICGS 1999, <http://www.aicgs.org/IssueBriefs/ulrich.html>).
33. In the mid-1990s approximately 60,000 Sorbs, 50,000 Danes (with German passports) and 350,000 Frisians in East Frisia, as well as 60,000 in North Frisia (10,000 of which were Frisian speakers) lived in Germany. See Ludwig Klemens, *Ethnische Minderheiten in Europa* (Munich, (1995).
34. Only about half of the approximately 110,000 Jews living in Germany have German citizenship. The other half of the population is composed overwhelmingly of "humanitarian quota refugees" (*Kontingenzflüchtlinge*), who have come to Germany since 1990 from the former Soviet Union.
35. Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven*, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt/M.-New York, 1999).
36. Bade (see note 23, 1992); Knuth Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer und bürgerlicher Staat* (Königstein, 1981).
37. Harbert (see note 6).
38. Many of the forced laborers, expellees, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates from the Soviet Union who were forcibly repatriated by the Western allies were, upon their return to the USSR, imprisoned in labor camps—some were even executed. The forced repatriation to the Soviet Union only came to a halt at the end of 1946, i.e., with the beginning of the Cold War. See Fassmann and Münz (see note 7).
39. Peter Luettinger: "Der Mythos der schnellen Integration: Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Integration der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1971," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 1 (1986): 20-36.
40. Without a formalized recruiting procedure at that time, Austrians also entered the country. See Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, *Einwanderungsland Österreich* (Vienna, 1995).
41. Hedwig Rudolph, "Die Dynamik der Einwanderung im Nichteinwanderungsland Deutschland," in Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, eds., *Migration in Europa: Historische Entwicklung, aktuelle Trends, politische Reaktionen* (Frankfurt/M.-New York, 1996), 161-181.
42. See also Charlotte Höhn and Detlev B. Rein, eds., *Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Boppard, 1990).
43. Friedrich Blahusch, "Flüchtlinge in Deutschland nach der Asylrechtsänderung im Grundgesetz," in Münz, Korte, and Wagner (see note 8); Bade (see note 23, 1994).

44. A list of these countries has been established by the German parliament (*Bundestag*).
45. Elmar Hönekopp, "The New Labor Migration as an Instrument of German Foreign Policy," in Münz and Weiner (see note 10), 165-182; Rudolph (see note 41); Johannes Velling, *Zuwanderer auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Sind die neuen Migranten die "Gastarbeiter" der neunziger Jahre?* (Mannheim, 1994).
46. Of the 650,000 foreigners (excluding *Aussiedler*) who were naturalized between 1970 and 1996 approximately two-thirds were born outside of Germany, and therefore belong to the group of foreign immigrants.
47. Of the 1.3 million citizens of (former) Yugoslavia in Germany (1996) almost 754,000 were citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbs, Montenegrans and Kosovo Albanians), 341,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (of which almost all were Bosnian Muslims) and 202,000 were Croatian citizens. Those people who had an old Yugoslav passport and had not yet applied to one of the successor states for citizenship at the time were counted as citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*ibid.*, Table 8). Most Bosnian war refugees lost their status in 1997-98 and were subsequently forced to return to their home country.
48. This figure does not include ethnic German immigrants (*Aussiedler*) from Poland.
49. Citizens of the other countries of the European Economic Area (EU-15 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) are in a similarly privileged position, although their numbers make them quantitatively unimportant. Because of the 1963 Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community, Turkish citizens have an easier entry to the German labor market after a minimum of a 5-year stay in the country. After the year 2001, Swiss citizens will get privileges similar to those of citizens of EES countries.
50. These include foreign students from non-EU countries as well as "new guest workers."
51. If asylum applicants are constitutionally recognized as refugees, they are given a permanent residence permit. According to the Geneva Convention, recognized refugees are to be given a right to residence (i.e., humanitarian quota refugees).
52. Included in this group are foreigners in refugee-like situations who have not applied for asylum (i.e., temporarily tolerated Bosnian war refugees) and asylum seekers whose application has been rejected.
53. Wolfgang Benz, ed., *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen* (Frankfurt/M., 1985); Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, eds., *Die Vertriebenen in Deutschland* (Kiel, 1959); Eduard Stanek, *Verfolgt - verjagt - vertrieben: Flüchtlinge in Österreich 1945-84* (Vienna-Munich-Zurich, 1985).
54. In the West, expellees predominantly found refuge in the British and American occupation zones. French military officials gave only approximately 300,000 expellees the right to settle in the portion of Germany which they controlled. See Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, eds., *Die Vertriebenen in Deutschland* (Kiel, 1959).
55. For a detailed discussion, see also Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger "Long-Distance Citizens: Ethnic Germans and their Immigration to Germany," in Peter H. Schuck and Rainer Münz, Rainer, eds., *Path to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany* (Oxford, 1998), 155-203.
56. Münz and Ohliger (see note 16).
57. Bethlehem (see note 23); Silke Delfs, "Heimatvertriebene, Aussiedler, Spätaussiedler," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament)*, 1993, B48/93, 3-11; Volker Ronge, "Ost-West-Wanderung nach Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament)*, 1993, B7/93, 16-28.
58. Of the *Aussiedler* from the CIS states (1991-96) 54 percent came from Kazakhstan, 35 percent from Russia (most of these from Siberia), 5 percent from Kyrgyzstan, and 6 percent from other countries.
59. Rainer Ohliger, "Rückgang des Zuzugs von Aussiedlern," *Migration und Bevölkerung* 3 (1998). See the decision of the National Administrative Court (BVwG Az 9c.8.96).